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Abstract 
 This paper is intended as an approach to the complex matter of the 
co-existence of long and short chains. It introduces a stimulus to further 
study these questions more thoroughly, which current market situations lead 
us to believe will be an interesting field, and one well worthy of 
consideration. 
It proposes analysing the advantages and weaknesses of the long and short 
chain in various different settings and environments. The ultimate aim is to 
help identify a better combination in the set-up of outlet methods into the 
agricultural-food markets. 
The study performed higlights: The effects of the increasing power of large-
scale retail distribution, hypotesis of future scenarios and the balance-
restoring function of the short chain; SWOT analysis of the short supply 
chain with reference to MEDCs and LEDCs contexts; Connections between 
short supply chain, self-centred development and protectionism; The non-
antagonistic relationship between long and short chain within the districts. 
The results of the analysis, showing the various, severe repercussions of the 
individual market’s action on the whole of the agricultural production 
economy and consumer well-being, highlight the trade-off, at times dramatic, 
between the various choices of economic and commercial policy. 
In thus doing, this work remarks the need for new studies aiming to assess 
the environments of greater relative convenience, those where there may be 
an overlay, juxtaposition and opposition of the long and short chain, in order 
to identify optimal coexistence equilibrium in the various contexts, on a local 
and, overall, global scale, between the two methods of sale on the 
agricultural food markets system. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Current relevance as to why alternative outlet circuits should be 
encouraged 
 In the current difficult, controversial economic situation, in which 
consumption as a whole, including food, has declined28, and both consumer 
demand and first-stage supply of agricultural production are experiencing a 
negative climate, we look to various different types of solution to provide an 
answer improving the current state of affairs.   
 Clearly, generalised price increases, of food and other products, 
create problems for consumers, and particularly those on lower incomes. We 
can also see, however, that the price difference between input and output, 
leads to huge difficulties for farms (Cicatiello, Franco, 2008), which are on 
the one hand crushed by increasing production costs, and on the other, by 
scarce incomes from product sales (Van der Ploeg, 2006). The problem lies 
in the fact that the difference between the price of food products to the farm 
and to the consumer, is unsustainably high due to the increases sustained 
during the various steps of production and distribution in a conventional 
chain. This with regards to more economic developed countries. Worldwide, 
and particularly in less economic developed countries, the problem of 
production-consumption price polarisation is extremely serious, causing 
phenomena such as the progressive impoverishing of agricultural workers 
and hindering objectives of reducing malnutrition and famine. 
 Responses to this situation include searching for alternative outlets by 
which to reduce price increases during the distribution chain and, particularly 
with reference to poorer countries exporting food and other agricultural 
produce, and which do not allocate their own production to domestic food 
consumption, by which to reduce unbalances in contractual strengths and 
asymmetric information to individual farmers and companies importing 
products and exporting technical tools. 
 The long-standing debate on the opportunities offered up by the so-
called ‘short chain’ or ‘short circuit’, intesa in tutte le sue manifestazioni 
(farmers’markets, direct farm sales, agritourism, box schemes, ecc) , thus 
takes on current relevance. As is known, the short chain, also commonly 
                                                          
28 Worldwide, except for those countries that have undergone very recent growth. Please note, in 
discussing changes in consumption, we particularly mean the situation in more economic developed 
countries, whilst with regards to less economic developed countries, where average consumptions 
already fall well below subsistence levels, we should really consider our failure to reach the increases 
anticipated. 
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referred to as “direct sale” has the characteristic of creating a direct 
relationship between producers and consumers, individual or associated. It 
determines precisely a “shortening” of the chain through the elimination or 
reduction of the number of commercial intermediaries and the journeys 
travelled by products, for which final distribution takes place in the same 
area of production. It is a current commercial formula, even if in more 
economic developed countries it appears to be taken back up from traditional 
local markets of the past29. This method of marketing, the advantages of 
which have been highlighted in literature and by agricultural category 
organisations on several occasions, constitutes an alternative commercial 
outlet that contrasts with the so-called “long chain” or with “long circuits” 
chain, of which the latter is discussed with regards to the “logistisation and 
globalisation of commercial flows” (Del Vecchio, 2008). 
 
1.2. Contents and significance of this study  
 This study constitutes an analysis of the weaknesses and advantages 
of the long and short chain and the coexistence equilibrium of the two chains 
in the markets. This may be balanced to a greater or lesser degree in terms of 
marketing shares that may lie with each of these two different methods of 
sale, in the structuring of the mix of commercial outlets on the agricultural 
food markets on different scales, in different contexts and situations. 
 The analysis is a contribution towards identifying the most 
appropriate “economic place” of each chain and the discussion that therefore 
ensues - showing the problems present and the various, severe repercussions 
of the individual market’s action on the whole of the production economy 
and consumer well-being - highlights the trade-off, which at times is 
dramatic, between the various choices of economic and commercial policy. 
 In thus doing, this work highlights the need for new, more complex 
studies focused on identifying and above all on attempting to quantify in the 
market systems, the socially most convenient balance of the coexistence of 
the two chains, or at least efficient balances. These studies - of which this is 
only an introductory approach, aimed purely at clarifying the problems at 
hand - would be more appropriate today than ever before, as they would fill a 
gap in research on this specific, difficult aspect of the general, more 
extensively discussed subject of commercial outlets with alternative chains. 
In this regard, it should be noted that the importance and lack of specific 
studies on other single themes in some way connected to the research for this 
equilibrium has already been highlighted. For example, Renting et al. (2003) 
                                                          
29 When goods were to a large extent produced and marketed within the sphere of the same area. The 
short chain appears in developed countries as a re-visitation of the weekly markets. It is a type of 
distribution that in recent years has seen a progressive diffusion in these countries with regards to 
agricultural and farming products 
European Scientific Journal   February 2014  edition vol.10, No.4  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
366 
- in observing the ferment underway in different areas of Europe, regarding 
both some current trends of food consumption and the new guidelines for the 
agricultural offer, after the failure of “industrial agriculture” - has sustained 
the need for more in-depth studies on the connection between short food 
supply chain and rural development, also highlighting the fact that “there is 
no one dominant model of development”, as is highlighted by the analysis 
“concerning the interactions between the farm, institutions, and the 
associational realm, and in appreciating the degree of variability”, 
considering that “these relationships must alter and reconfigure over time 
and space”. 
 
2. Objectives and methods  
 The study aims to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the short 
chain as compared with the long chain in various different contexts and 
situations, to help identify the best possible combination in the articulation of 
methods for outlet release on agricultural food markets. 
 The method used is simply that of context analysis and, more 
specifically, the SWOT analysis performed on the short chain outlet method. 
This analysis was carried out with an in-depth reflection on the empirical 
evidence and with the support of extensive critical analyses of literature on 
the subject, data and information available; this has enabled a full 
investigation of the advantages and weaknesses of the short chain versus the 
long chain in different market contexts on various scales and of the 
repercussions worldwide of individual local action. 
 For simplicity, the SWOT analysis refers to just two different macro-
contexts: more economic developed countries and less economic developed 
countries, grouping the different situations examined in various contexts. 
 
3. Results and discussion  
 The results of the analysis are given in an articulated discussion, in 
which: 
 with reference to the long chain, the effects of the increasing power of 
large-scale retail distribution are carefully examined, after having noted 
the continual concentration of distribution chains and the reasons for this; 
 the market evolution is discussed along with the need for a control over 
the power of large-scale retail distribution, on the future scenarios that 
can be hypothesised and the balance-restoring function of the short chain;   
 the critical issues and advantages of the short chain, as concerned by the 
SWOT analysis performed, are analysed with reference to two different 
contexts;    
 the situations are identified within different micro and macro-contexts in 
which the short or long chain find their most appropriate "economic 
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place" and can be efficient;  
 the connections between short chain, self-centred development and 
protectionism are considered; 
 the non-antagonistic relationship between the two different outlet 
methods examined is highlighted, within specific production districts. 
 
3.1.The growing power of large scale retail distribution and its effects. 
3.1.1 The long circuits and retail food distribution market structure 
 The ease of transport together with the speed at which information 
circulates and the growing logistics organisation have resulted in a 
globalisation of trade flows.  
This also takes place for food products, much of which are marketed 
through ‘long circuits’ involving a breakdown and delocalisation of the 
individual production activities, various commercial intermediaries and 
lengthy travel. We find products from all different countries available on the 
same market at the same time. At times we cannot even completely control 
origin, as the areas of farm production are entirely independent of those of 
consumption and also product transformation. These are circuits typically 
used by large-scale retail distribution (LSRD)30. 
 This type of chain, first considered to be at maximum efficiency at 
least in 'financial’ or ‘merchant’ terms, has recently been criticised from an 
overall economic viewpoint that includes social and environmental aspects. 
The evolutionary dynamics of retail food trade that initially occurred 
in the United States of America early last century, and which subsequently 
involved the whole of Europe followed by various countries of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, have led to a progressive concentration of the market by 
increasingly fewer, but larger businesses (Lawrence F.,2004): multinational 
companies. Currently and prospectively, according to some forecasts, these 
multinationals would then tend towards a further significant concentration. 
This is the result of a long, articulated process of dimensional growth 
assisted by various factors that have, over time and by means of a continuous 
process of mergers and acquisitions and at times also of simultaneous 
internationalisation of the companies, determined the current global and local 
food market order, in addition to the “structural and functional relations 
order characterising modern food distribution” within (Pulina, 2009). 
                                                          
30 Even if in the various branches and settings in which LSRD is articulated, local products may also 
be marketed. Moreover, as we will see, it is not only the physical distance between the area of 
production and of consumption, but also the different contractual power with regards to producers that 
characterises respectively the long chain and the short chain. 
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 The factors that above all have helped confirm these orders lie in the 
important role played by scale31 and scope32 economies in the sector of 
modern food distribution and by the large sizes required to reach an efficient 
scale. These factors are also related to the progressive expansion of market 
space and goods circuits on a global level33, which is in clear contradiction 
with the theoretical supposition that market expansion should increase, rather 
than reduce the number of companies involved34. This apparent contradiction 
with the existence of an inverse ratio between the level of concentration and 
market dimension can, in fact, be logically explained, as identified by Sutton 
(1991) in the differentiation of unrecoverable fixed costs (sunk costs) 35  in 
hexogens and endogens.  
 The first are determined by factors external to the business and refer 
to incoming market conditions (such as the costs for entering a sector marked 
by high scale economies). The second (such as investments in advertising 
and R&D36) are not determined exogenously from the market the business is 
looking to enter, but are decided by the companies and constitute strategic 
variables of choice for the companies themselves (see Giorgetti,1998; Pulina, 
2009).  
 Sutton confirms the truth behind the existence of an inverse 
relationship between the market dimensions and concentration for sectors 
characterised by exogenous sunk costs37, but shows that this is not the case 
for sectors characterised by endogenous sunk costs. This is due to the fact 
that whilst the first remain constant as market dimensions increase, the 
                                                          
31 Linked not only to the large surface areas in which sales are concentrated, but also to the whole 
commercial organisation complex. 
32 Large-scale distribution tends to offer ranges of products, not exclusively food-related, and 
increasingly varied services. 
33 In turn linked to the increasing ‘facility’ of transport over long stretches (increased transport speed 
and, at the same time, a ‘banalisation’ of the relevant costs, at least up until now, where, instead, we 
see an increase of these costs that could result in a reversal of trends) together with the speed with 
which information circulates and the increasing logistical organisation. 
34 The volume of demand in relation to the efficient scale dimension (of an installation or other 
investment type) and to the consequent quantity it is worth each company producing (for simplicity, 
hypothesising that each company uses just one installation or investment of efficient size), should 
empirically indicate the number of businesses that are able to exist on a market. 
35 These are fixed costs defined as such because, in adopting a scheme of “game theory”, with several 
stages, as they are carried out in the initial stages of play, in the final stage they are no longer 
considered recoverable. 
36 As Giorgetti (1998) points out, it is important to stress that “the nature of costs is not defined by the 
type of expense (e.g. in advertising and R&D etc.), but rather by the purpose for which the expense is 
sustained”.  For example, amounts spent on R&D “when these are sustained to an equal extent by rival 
companies, they constitute exogenous sunk costs rather than endogenous”. 
37 Sutton actually shows that at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the number of businesses entering a 
sector characterised by exogenous sunk costs is inversely related to the set-up costs, namely those 
costs that businesses have to sustain in order to enter an industry by purchasing an individual plant to 
operate on a minimum efficient scale. Sutton shows that this number is directly proportional to market 
dimension.  
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second grow. Consequently, in this case the number of businesses does not 
increase with the total market volume (Pulina, 2009). 
 In actual fact, what happens is that when businesses invest in 
unrecoverable endogenous costs (such as fixed costs for investment in 
advertising or R&D), they obtain more than proportional earnings for an 
increase of their commercialisation shares that is ever greater than the 
growth in market size. They are therefore encouraged to make such 
investments, thereby increasing fixed costs and consequently giving rise to a 
market structure that is progressively less fragmented.  
The market structure that tends to be created spontaneously with the 
concentrations applied in a bid to reach the most efficient scale dimension by 
which to make best use of investments giving rise to these sunk costs is 
mainly of an oligopolistic type. We therefore have the conditions for a 
natural oligopoly.  
 According to Ellickson (2004), the conditions are created for a 
natural oligopoly that would appear not to tend to become a monopoly, 
insofar as no business gains standing over a specific market segment (a given 
area or product), but rather each is in competition with the others on all areas 
and on the whole range of products. A market structure therefore forms with 
few companies fighting “head to head”, always improving the quality of 
supply.  
 On this matter, we should note that in using the term ‘quality’, it is 
assumed that Ellickson was not so much referring to excellence in intrinsic 
product quality (linked to the agricultural production phase and which can 
generally be seen not as the primary objective of large-scale distribution), as 
to the quality of the organisation. A quality organisation, therefore, in these 
terms is one able to supply products that are, in any case, of relatively good 
basic quality, a standard guaranteed by specific labelling, but at limited 
prices, of homogenous sizing, with a wide variety of choice the whole year 
round, increasingly pre-prepared and ready for consumption, well packaged 
in a practical manner, with a view to time-saving (including layout, parking 
and opening hours) on the market. This is the quality that successfully meets 
the various consumer demands.  
 The same author, also pointed out that together with the few, large 
businesses concentrating most of the supply, a fringe sector of small retailers 
also coexists (whose presence is ignored in Sutton’s models). These small 
businesses manage to survive and, on the contrary to the mentioned large 
enterprises, tend to be more numerous as the market dimensions grow, as the 
type of sunk costs faced is exogenous rather than endogenous. The market 
share held by this fringe group of small businesses is significantly more 
minor than that held by the large sales chains (hence Sutton’s model on the 
prevalent effects of endogenous sunk costs towards concentration does not 
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cease validity), however we believe that, even if only small, it is of 
significant social strategic importance. This is because it can assume a 
controlling role that is such as to be able to mitigate the power of the few 
large companies in a market structure that remains basically oligopolistic. 
And it must be considered that amongst said fringe of small businesses, there 
may also be farmers’ market businesses, for which we wish to highlight the 
possibility of taking on that role. 
 
3.1.2 The positive and negative effects of the affirmation of large-scale retail 
distribution. 
 The affirmation of the LSRD and its oligopolistic structure imply 
important consequences in terms of economic efficiency and social 
wellbeing. We need simply consider the breadth that the well-known 
Harberger triangle (1954) can take on, representing the loss of economic 
efficiency38 caused by monopolistic power or even, in this case, by 
oligopolistic power (figure 1). The breadth of this triangle increases for 
market structures that are increasingly distant from conditions of perfect 
competition, until reaching a stage where it covers 25% of the total surplus 
generally realised in a market with perfect competition (Sexton, 2009).  
                                                          
38 In terms of net loss of a share of consumer surplus, realisable and entirely usable by the consumer in 
conditions of perfect competition, which, in non-competitive market structures, cannot be used by 
consumers and is only partly reabsorbed by the profits that can be used by businesses with market 
power, and is therefore partly lost. 
D
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Qm is the quantity that equals MR = LMC; Pc and Pm are the prices at which the demand D is willing to purchase respectively quantities Qc 
and Qm.
Pr= Demand reservation price; Ec= Equilibrium in competition, with a quantity sold Qc, at a price Pc 
Pc=LAC=LMC; Mr= Marginal Revenue; Qc is the quantity that equals MR = LMC
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In a monopolistic market regime or in any case one 
that is a long way from perfect competition, the 
yield represented by the area of the triangle C-EC-
EM is lost, it may not be enjoyed by the 
consumers purchasing nor by the businesses 
selling, but a clear loss for society.
In actual fact, the consumer is only 
left with the yield area Pr-Pm-Em and 
the monopoly profit (Pm-Pc)*Qm
does not cover all the remaining area 
of the total surplus Pr-Pc-Ec, which 
the consumer would instead have 
enjoyed in a regime of perfect 
competition.
Figure 1. Social loss in the monopoly (and in the oligopoly)
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 This loss of economic efficiency may, however, be recovered by the 
reduction in costs caused by the scale efficiency arising in oligopolistic 
companies (as in a natural monopoly) due to the large sizes (figure 2). This 
latter can allow for a reduction in prices that small competitive enterprises, 
who may have an inefficient scale dimension, can simply not afford. On the 
other hand, it is a well-known fact that the spontaneous onset in the market 
of a competitive or non-competitive structure with more or fewer small 
enterprises, or the affirmation of a few businesses or just one large business, 
depends to a great extent on the minimum dimension required to reach an 
efficient scale and on the dimensions of the demand to be met. 
   
What is certain is that, rather than in terms of pure economic 
efficiency loss, we need to assess the effects of the LSRD market power, 
both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic, on the social wellbeing of consumers 
and producers. 
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LMC1=LAC1
LMC1 =Long-run Marginal Cost  in competition; LAC1=Long-run Average Cost  in competition ; LMC2 =Long-run Marginal Cost  in 
monopoly; LAC2=Long-run Average Cost  in monopoly
Mr=Marginal Revenue; D= Demand; Pr= Demand reservation price
Em= Equilibrium in monopoly, with a quantity sold Qm, at a price Pm; Ec= Equilibrium in competition, with a quantity sold Qc, at a price
Pc (Pc1 or Pc2, in relation to possible different costs)
A single large business (or a few large businesses) with scale economies can 
enjoy  lower cost conditions than small businesses (in relation to demand) 
operating on a competitive market (LAC2, LMC2<LAC1, LMC1)
This gives rise to a surplus, enjoyed by these large businesses, represented by 
the area of the rectangle Pc1-Pc2-C1-C2.
This rectangle can be of various 
dimensions, sometimes even greater 
than the triangle C-EC-EM of loss of 
consumer surplus, more than 
compensating for the loss of this return 
for the society as a whole.
Figure 2. Scale efficiency and social and economic advantages of the natural monopoly (and oligopoly)
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 With reference to the positive, or apparently positive effects on 
consumers, we can state that, in contrast with the normal effects of an 
oligopolistic market structure, large scale retail distribution has not yet 
shown a trend to raise prices; on the contrary, it tends to have a retail price-
controlling effect, indeed we speak of a magnet function of consumer prices. 
There is even a tradition to this end, as this role has been played since the 
very start of the major sales chains, in the period of the “great economic 
depression”, to such an extent that it is considered a mission of LSRD. 
Furthermore, this task is inherent to the managerial structure of  large scale 
retail distribution, based on the sale of high product volumes with profit 
margins that, even if overall, are high, are relatively low in terms of product 
unit (Lawrence and Burch, 2007; Pulina, 2009).  
 This limitation of unitary margins and consequently of retail prices 
has been made possible by the large dimensions of the sales chains, which, 
through the pursuit of scale and scope economies, allow for a limitation of 
distribution service costs. These are drastically reduced by the wide-scale 
availability of suitable infrastructures and technologies and the 
organisational efficiency of logistics. Pressure to lower prices may also be 
applied, within the oligopolistic structure, caused by the possible competition 
of new incoming businesses able to offer goods at lower prices than those 
already on the market, in a framework of a cyclical renewal of the sector 
structural organisation, envisaged by the fundamental theory of the evolution 
of the retail distribution system (McNair, 1958; Hollander, 1960; McNair e 
May,1978; Brown, 1990; Pulina, 2009).  
However, the limitation of retail prices of food products is not only 
due to the reduction of costs and limiting of distribution service unitary 
margins. Above all, this limitation is due to the contractual strength of the 
major sales chains, which allows them to reduce production prices of agri-
industrial products, and in particular agricultural products to a minimum39, 
upon their farm gate purchase. In actual fact, it is not so much the unitary 
margins of large retail distribution that reduce (albeit with the aim of 
increasing total income), as those – unitary and overall – of the first 
productive phase in the farm. 
The negative effects of LSRD power therefore occur more in terms of 
its effect on the initial producers than on end consumers. Producers, in fact, 
suffer this power both – as is clearest – with reference to its oligopsonistic 
                                                          
39 Considering that the dimensions and contractual power of farms, at the first stage of production, are 
considerably lower than those of agricultural-industrial businesses. With regards to the reduction of the 
prices of agricultural-industrial products, it is, in fact, the effects of a superior countervailing power 
held by large-scale retail distribution with regards to agricultural-industry (which, moreover, held it 
years back both with regards to agriculture and retail distribution, before the affirmation of LSRD). It 
is, therefore, a situation that differs distinctly from the preponderant market power exercised in an 
imbalanced manner by LSRD itself over agricultural producers, in entirely asymmetrical conditions.  
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aspect, but also, as Sexton (2009) points out, with reference to its 
oligopolistic aspect and, in any case, to their combined effect.  
The first aspect (oligopsonistic) determines an unbalanced contractual 
relationship with agricultural producers, who find themselves imposed prices 
and conditions of sale. This clearly derives from the fact that the market 
structure of the stage of first agricultural production is "naturally" 
competitive, considering that in the agricultural sector, scale efficiency can 
be achieved by businesses with various dimensions, including small ones, 
given the presence of different technologies40. This is why (differently to in 
other sectors, including that of large-scale distribution), the demand for food 
products at the first stage of production can be met by the supply of a 
multitude of various different size businesses (and not necessarily by a few, 
or by just one large business that in order to achieve scale efficiency must be 
so large as to saturate the entire demand). Each of the many farms, with 
dimension of the supply having no influence over price, contrasts with the 
few businesses of large-scale distribution that concentrate the demand of a 
myriad of end consumers.  Therefore, we have this imbalanced relationship 
between two market structures with different contractual powers: a supply of 
a type that is naturally competitive in relation to a demand that is of a type 
that is naturally oligopsonistic. 
The second aspect (oligopolistic) however, can also result in a 
reduction of prices of agricultural produce at the first stage of production. On 
this matter, we must consider that despite its efficient organisation, the 
oligopolistic structure of large-scale distribution has negative effects lying in 
the very nature of oligopolistic power, which tends to reduce the supply of 
goods on the market in order to obtain greater profits. According to a normal 
logic for the exploitation of this power, the total supply of agri-food products 
to the end consumers, available from the enterprises of large-scale 
distribution should be lower (in order to raise prices) than as would be the 
case in a situation of perfect competition. It therefore follows that the 
demand for farm products (to then be offered to end consumers) from these 
large-scale distributors should also be lower. This possible reduction in the 
volume of the supply to consumption and consequently the demand to the 
                                                          
40 Therefore, in this case it is not necessarily true that only large farms can reach increased scale 
performance. Medium farms, and indeed small farms, can too, where efficient scale is reached within a 
fairly small dimension. In this regard, Chavas (2008) points out, also citing other authors (Hall and 
Leveen, 1978), that in the agricultural sector of developed countries, empirical evidence shows that the 
function of the average cost has a typical L-shape: the average cost tends to decrease as the small 
dimensions of the businesses grow and therefore reach a shorter continuous line of stabilisation of 
scale returns for dimensions of medium to large size businesses. In actual fact, the existence of 
multiple technologies allows different breadth farms to choose the technology most appropriate to their 
dimensions, thereby each reaching better scale performance, cutting average costs, or at least obtaining 
constant performance.     
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farm would therefore in itself reduce - even regardless of oligopsony power –
the equilibrium price of food products.  
In any case, it must be admitted that the prices imposed on 
agricultural producers are generally rather disadvantageous, to the point 
where, in some cases, production is discouraged and, in any case, the 
objective of striving for excellent quality is depressed. The minimal sales 
margins resulting in the obligation to maximum reduction of production 
costs does not, in fact, allow for a high intrinsic quality level to be reached in 
products, unless this quality excellence is recognised (certified) and 
protected under the scope of large consortia that enjoy a certain contractual 
powe41. Alternatively, the stated minimal margins can be overcome where 
this quality is so high as to be appreciated and required by a few discerning 
consumers who are willing to pay the price difference – or alternatively 
willing to lose out in terms of time-saving – for the higher quality of specific 
products, which can then be conveniently sold outside the large-scale retail 
distribution circuit42.  
We must also consider that the major sales chains determine a 
delayed, incomplete and, above all, asymmetrical transmission to 
consumption of price changes at production (Sexton, 2009). This 
transmission – due to the stated contractual unbalance with the agricultural 
counterparty – is far more sensitive (and complete) in relation to price 
increases (and relevant trading sales margins) and far less at their reduction, 
as widely shown by a great many studies (Pick, Karrenbrock and Carman, 
1990, for citrus fruits; Zhang, Fletcher, and Carley,1995, for peanuts; 
Richards and Patterson, 2003, for fresh fruit, partially perishable; Kinnucan 
and Forker, 1987,  Carman, 1998, Frigon, Doyon and Romani, 1999, Carman 
e Sexton, 2005, for dairy products; and Li, 2007, for the avocado).  
 When, for example, in periods of economic crisis, there is a drop in 
consumption, even if limited43, this causes distribution to decrease retail 
prices, yet marketing margins tend to remain constant, insofar as the 
reduction is generally almost entirely transferred to production prices. As 
such, the consequences on the agricultural sector are more significant than 
may initially appear to be the case when examining the drop in consumption 
and retail prices (De Stefano, 1985).  
                                                          
41 For example, in Italy this is the case of parmigiano reggiano or grana Padano cheese41, Parma ham, 
etc., consortia for which the market power of the LSRD would appear to be fairly limited with respect 
to the suppliers (Sckokai et al., 2009).  
42 In actual fact, the consumers of these products constitute a specific target, which accounts for a 
meagre share of the demand and that can be satisfied by the fringe group of small retail sellers. These 
may also comprise direct sales at farmers markets within specific market niches that are not attractive 
to large-scale distribution.  
43 Given that at least in developed countries, the demand for food is not particularly sensitive to 
income changes (Liefert and Shane, 2009). 
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 In actual fact, we can see that due to the substantial difficulty in 
reducing marketing margins, in periods of economic crisis the ratio of retail 
food prices and farm food prices worsens (Frascarelli, 2009). Vice versa, 
when an increase in demand encourages an increase in retail prices, this is 
less than proportionally transferred to farm gate prices. 
 On this regard, not everyone agrees on assigning large-scale retail 
distributors the merits of a ceiling limit to prices, whilst there is greater 
agreement on assigning them a ‘stabilising' function, whereby repeated 
projections are prohibited, which is of some use in granting consumers a 
sense of security. This stabilising function is, however, seen exclusively in 
the consumers’ benefit, whilst the opposite can be said of the producers 
where large-scale retail distributors determine a continuous instability of 
prices44 and insecurity in sales, given that where possible, they search for 
lower production prices and consequently change suppliers as they wish to 
obtain the most favourable purchase conditions. 
 Considering that the profits earned by the marketing sector in the 
market are represented by a rectangle whose height is equal to the difference 
between retail price and production price, less distribution costs, and whose 
width is equal to the volume of sales to consumers, any business with market 
power tends to slightly reduce the consumer price increase in order to 
maintain or increase sales volumes, and to significantly reduce the 
production price to be paid to farmers (Sexton, 2012), thereby extending the 
height of the entire rectangle (figure 3).  
                                                          
44 “ Retail prices to farmers that adjust only partially, or not at all, to shocks in the farm market are 
harmful, tending to reduce average farm income and increase its variability” (Sexton, 2009). 
PRICE:
Retail price –
Production 
price 
and 
marketing 
sector costs
QUANTITY: Volume of retail sales
Profits 
earned 
by 
the 
marketing sector 
For the commercial sector wishing to expand the area of the rectangle, it is most 
convenient to increase its height by reducing the prices at production rather than 
by increasing those at consumption, in order to avoid a reduction in the quantity 
sold (width of the rectangle)
Figure 3. Profits of LRSD
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This would determine a simultaneous reduction in consumptions and 
excesses in production, with a consequent reduction in social wellbeing45. 
This therefore leads us to consider that the effect of the possible expansion of 
this rectangle would cause rather more damaging effects in terms of 
distribution of wealth and wellbeing than simply a loss of economic 
efficiency given by the breadth of the Harberger triangle (Sexton, 2009).  
 A consumer price limitation function is in any case carried out, albeit 
to a large extent to the detriment of the production stage. Those who sustain 
the positive effects of the power of large-scale retail distribution do, 
however, believe that it does not definitively damage producers but rather 
induces them to greater efficiency, forcing them to minimise the production 
costs of food and forcing them to form consortia, in order to offer high 
volumes of standardised product in the time frames and methods required by 
the large sales chains. With this, and with other initiatives directly 
undertaken to aggregate the supply and make it functional to their needs, 
large-scale retail distribution has the merit of rationalising the chain, 
eliminating the cost of some inefficient intermediations. Definitively, the 
LSRD tend to shorten the chain. 
 At this point it appears to make no sense to speak of a long chain 
when we refer to large sales chains contrasting with the short chain, in which 
the direct sales method of the farmers’ market identifies itself. In truth, in 
this latter case, we should speak of a chain that is even very short (with a 
single passage producer-consumer), but at the same time, it must be 
considered that the organisation of large sales chains aims to rationalise 
distribution and therefore, as just highlighted, does not in itself tend to 
lengthen the chain, if not for the fact that its provisions, as they are carried 
out where the large businesses find the most convenience and the product in 
all seasons, involve very different, distant areas, which means transporting 
food products over long distances (completely the opposite of zero km) and 
longer distribution circuits with respect to the marketing of local products 
within the same area of production. Moreover, what distinguishes the short 
chain from the long chain is not so much the degree of commercial 
“disintermediation” in itself, as it is the type of more balanced contractual 
relationship between production, distribution and consumption (see 
paragraph 3.5).  
                                                          
45 “This point is of considerable importance because much of our market analysis is policy oriented, 
with specific policies designed to help farmers and oftentimes also poor consumers” (Sexton, 2009). 
The countervailing power exercised by large-scale distributors with regards the agri-food industry also 
translated into “consumer benefits through lower sales prices only where significant competition 
remains in the retail phase” (Pulina, 2009), namely conditions that are not far off perfect competition. 
These conditions refer to the situation whereby the services offered by retailers are perceived by 
consumers as close substitutes (Dobson and Waterson, 1997). 
European Scientific Journal   February 2014  edition vol.10, No.4  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
377 
 Going back to the problem of negative spin-off of LSRD power on 
producer wellbeing, it has been shown (Alston, Sexton, and Zhang’s,199746; 
Zhang and Sexton (2002)47; Sexton et al, 200748; Saitone, Sexton  and 
Sexton S.E., 200849) that this distorts farmers’ production decisions and 
discourages there investments. Hence the effects of agricultural policies 
encouraging production or investment are in vain when in assessing their 
implementation, no account is taken of being faced with an imperfectly 
competitive market, with a varying level of market power 50 (Russo, 2009). 
 Marketing companies with even relatively modest market power can 
capture large slices of the benefits from policies focussed on farmers 
(Sexton, 2009). Clearly, the possibility of distorting the decisions of farmers, 
depressing their investments and production is higher, the more relevant 
market power of the marketing businesses is. As this power increases, in 
fact, the benefits of or a shift of the consumption demand curve, brought 
about, for example, by a promotion of the consumption of agricultural 
products, are partly increasingly captured by the commercial sector, thereby 
preventing farmers from investing in programmes aimed at increasing 
sales.51 
 This can have important spin-offs on policies for liberalising 
international trade too, under the scope of strategies aimed at encouraging 
                                                          
46 With specific regard to the effects on the distribution of the benefits of agricultural scientific 
research to businesses.  
47 With specific reference to product promotion investments. 
48 With specific reference to the effects on the benefits of commercial liberalisation.  
49 With specific reference to the effects on the distribution of the benefits of public grants (in the 
specific case, grants distributed in the USA to cereal crops for the production of ethanol). The 
assessment model, previously only competitive type, is extended in a framework that considers the 
market power both up and downstream of farms. 
50 This implies the awareness of the need for further public spending if we wish to allow farmers to 
benefit, considering that part of the grant by destined for them is used downstream trade 
intermediaries. It also involves the assessment of the distorted destination of the grant and the social 
worth of supplying it.  
51 Also the benefits of a shift of the supply curve of agricultural production determined by the effects 
of aids in favour of farmers or research in the agricultural field (in terms of innovations to be applied 
to agriculture) are partly absorbed by large-scale distribution (cases studies are showed by Alston, 
Sexton, and Zhang’s, 1997) and partly by final consumers. This happens because, given the situation 
of competition among the agricultural firms, a reduction in the production cost it determines the new 
entry of enterprises in the market, an increase of the production and the consequent shift  of the supply 
curve. Where demand is stable this shift is mirrored in a reduction in prices to consumptions, which is 
more than proportional than the increase in the quantity sold because the demand for food products is 
for the most part inelastic. If the demand is not increased, the reduction of the benefits for the farmers 
depends on the different elasticity ratio of the supply and the demand. Therefore  in the long run this in 
itself can delete any profit for farmers, really the reduction in prices can decrease the total revenue. To 
worst this situation there is a far greater reduction in prices at the farm gates compared to that seen in 
final distribution to consumption, becouse it being almost impossible to compress the marketing 
margins of large-scale retail distribution, due to the stronger contractual power of large-scale retail 
distribution regards to farmers. So, the LRSD sells more volume of product almost at the same 
previous margins and increase its revenue, reducing farmers’ and consumers’ benefits. 
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farming in developing countries. On this, the analysis carried out by Sexton 
et al. (2007) shows, for example, that even a limited level of market power, 
when exercised on several stages of the distribution chain, allows 
commercial businesses to capture approximately half the benefits deriving 
from the liberalisation of international trade. Consequently, relatively little of 
these benefits remains for the farmers of less economic developed countries, 
the actual intended beneficiaries of the advantages deriving from free trade 
policies. 
 
3.2. The market evolution and the need to control the power of large-scale 
retail distribution: the role of the “short chain”  
 As can be seen, LSRD enjoys undisputed, growing market power. 
This is expressed in significant positive and negative effects on consumers 
and producers. We can only ask ourselves if the market evolution, with the 
concentration processes still underway, will lead the system towards a 
prevalence of one or the other, even if on the basis of that discussed thus far, 
it would appear most likely that, for lack of corrective interventions, the 
social costs of concentrated distribution will exceed the benefits (apart from 
other aspects such as the loss of economic efficiency, which may be 
disputed).  
 We also wonder if it will be possible to control the effects of these 
dynamics through public regulation (at the level of individual states or 
supranational and global), considering that LSRD, by virtue of its contractual 
power, represents an authority (Pulina, 2009)52 and, as such, plays a social 
role involving voluntary or compulsory (assigned by government) 
responsibility. 
 A control of the behaviour of LSRD, if carried out using regulatory 
tools, is problematic and particularly on a supranational level53, requires 
careful analysis and a significant political commitment.  
 With a view to attaining a re-balance, however, one simple measure 
that could be easily implemented both on a local and global scale, may be 
that of facilitating the creation of alternative marketing circuits (short chain), 
acting, without altering natural market dynamics, or not so much artificially 
                                                          
52 Authority recognised by consumers and ‘citizens’ in general (Zamagni, 2006; Pulina, 2009), who 
consider LSRD as able to impose its will on other stages of the chain and who, in many ways, hope for 
intervention not only in order to rationalise the very chain itself, but also to direct it in order to reach 
the various “social functions”. We speak of functions (Pulina, 2009) that in the citizens’ expectations 
range from price control and food safety (in terms of “health and quality guarantee of foodstuffs”) to 
the promotion of new supply directions more aware of “environmental and territorial protection, 
optimising typical, local and national produce and fairness and transparency of the production 
processes and managerial protocols applied throughout the whole chain”.  
53 Where wholesale market power crosses, as yet not organised, power relevant to the complex issue 
and, above all, the imposition of an international right. 
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encouraging the birth, in so much as removing any obstacles to their 
spontaneous development. On this, with reference to the possibility of 
spontaneous development, we must not underestimate this existence – albeit 
under the scope of a substantially oligopolistic market – of a fringe of small 
retail sellers (see paragraph 3.1). The fact that these businesses remain and 
their number grows as the market extends, is not exclusively due to the fact, 
already mentioned by Ellickson (2004), that these businesses do not deal 
with endogenous sunk costs, but we must also consider the fact that they are 
able of offering specific products or services, setting up a sort of 
monopolistic competition. This latter market structure, which blends in with 
the oligopoly in retail distribution, may also further develop in relation to the 
mutating demands and dimensions of the demand, but in any case its entire 
disappearance is not realistic.  
 It is, in fact, difficult that the small businesses supplying products or 
services that are not easily replaceable (such as small stores offering the 
advantage of being located near the buyer’s home, or the farmer’s market 
offering a product with unique, unrepeatable characteristics). These are 
businesses in a situation that protects them from competition, even with 
stronger businesses. Clearly this occurs within certain limits that can be seen 
in the holding, by such small businesses, of interstitial market niches, the 
extent of which depends on the structure of the demand. Moreover, this can 
happen above all if the large companies have no interest in competing 
(making further investments aimed at pursuing other types of offer to acquire 
minimal market shares. 
 If it is not realistic that this fringe of small businesses should 
disappear, it is not unrealistic to suppose that – with the possible growth of 
their number – the total market share held by these should grow in a 
significant manner (and under the scope of these, we refer in particular to 
farmers’ markets and other short chain modes). 
 We start from the idea that the free forces determining market 
efficiency lead to the affirmation of large-scale retail distribution and to a 
natural oligopoly, as, moreover, has effectively been verified. If the so-called 
“invisible hand” really does lead to this situation, it would be pointless and 
damaging to interfere, distorting the market balance, which would in any 
case be restored in an altered fashion.  
 But is it true that the current market mechanisms tend towards a 
situation of “Walrassian equilibrium”? Or do imbalanced situations instead 
tend to increase? Is that equilibrium generally restored or do we move away 
from it? How was the current situation determined? Have the “natural” 
forces of the market not already been altered on several occasions by 
interventions that have driven in different directions to beforehand? 
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 Therefore, this “natural” affirmation of an oligopolistic distribution 
structure has been true in a given historic period, but it has not always been 
thus nor is it said that it will always be so. Without promoting obscurantist 
intentions and considering going back in history, without de-recognising the 
progress made by technology and logistics that lead to a certain type of 
efficiency in trade, it is in any case interesting to see what, at present, are the 
conditions that may promote a modern review and revaluation of the short 
chain.  
 Moreover, it is not entirely absurd to hypothesise that even in the 
success of certain market forms, a sort of adverse selection may exist, as is 
the case for some products. The success of a sales method, like that of large-
scale retail distribution, apparently more efficient and satisfying multiple 
consumer demands, but substantially less in line, at least for some essential 
aspects, with social requirements54, can be determined by cumulative 
phenomena of the affirmation of (and suppression by) certain circuits, 
processes and behaviour.  
 Routes already taken are repeated according to a scheme of path 
dependency because this takes less effort and imagination, as quasi 
automatic routines have already been created. However, it is entirely 
legitimate to doubt the validity of these routes and ask ourselves: is it utopian 
to think about potentially returning to competition in distribution? Changing 
oligopsonistic contractual relations between production and distribution 
despite rationalising the chains? Does all this go against the “natural” 
equilibrium of the market, which brings about at least efficiency (if not 
equity)? 
 Is it possible to identify a situation of greater equilibrium on the 
market that assigns, if not most, at least a larger share of the market to the 
short (indeed very short) chain in the distribution of food products? Or does 
market efficiency inexorably lead to the ever-greater concentration of 
distribution businesses and an increase in their oligopolistic and 
oligopsonistic power? And in this case, what future scenario or future 
alternative scenarios can be hypothesised? 
 At present, we are faced with an imbalanced ratio of two different 
market structures: supply by a great many competitor businesses of various 
sizes, with respect to a demand by just a few, large oligopsonistic businesses. 
Moreover, farms do not always achieve efficiency and supply as a whole 
                                                          
54 Environmental protection, excellence of intrinsic product quality and optimisation of agricultural 
production with the consequent safeguarding from decadence of rural territories of market proximity, 
greater transparency on the evolution of product prices and on the quality-price ratio and finally, food 
security in terms of continuity of volumes supplied suited to the extent of the demand and not 
artificially reduced (according to the extreme possible consequences of a market logic connected with 
an oligopolistic power that could be ever stronger due to the further concentrations forecast). 
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suffers from organisational problems in relating to demand, with consequent 
malfunctions in the chain as a whole. 
 One future scenario that can be hypothesised in the event of the 
persistence of the ever-greater tendency we are seeing towards concentration 
in distribution businesses, is that the growth of this power may lead, by 
reaction, to a rationalisation and growing concentration of supply by farmers 
and the farming industry, until reaching a bilateral oligopoly 
(oligopsony/oligopoly) able to balance out the contractual strength of the 
LSRD. 
 The potential final formation of such a double oligopolistic structure 
in the food market is, however, assumed only to be able to develop very 
slowly and with difficulty, both due to the need for an artificial “de-
naturalisation” of the already mentioned “natural” competitive structure of 
the agricultural production sector and due to a series of structural restrictions 
of farms and farmers cultures, with general organisational type difficulties, 
which would hinder the concentration process at the stage of the first 
agricultural production.  
 Moreover, it should be feared that its realisation, despite better 
balancing contractual strength ratios between production and distribution 
businesses, may generate major tension between the two counterparties, 
perhaps to the detriment of the end consumers. The latter, moreover, may in 
turn become concentrated into buying groups, creating a sort of three-
dimensional “arm wrestle”, which in this case would perhaps tend to reduce 
precisely the margins of large-scale retail distribution.  
 Another scenario may be that rather than make the oligopolistic 
concentration of businesses extreme on several fronts, the market is moved 
in the opposite direction, privileging a more fragmented and competitive 
market structure. In this case, a market is hypothesised with less impersonal, 
more direct trade relations between producers and consumers, as in the case 
of the short chain. Growth of this latter outlet method, moreover, in addition 
to re-establishing more direct relations between the various stages of the 
production chain, may also facilitate the affirmation of a market structure 
that, despite the presence of large-scale retail businesses, would tend to be 
more competitive. 
 We wonder which of the hypotheses put forward may be realised and 
how the phenomenon of the short chain will evolve over time. According to 
Renting et al. (2003) “a major question remains as to whether this represents 
a long-lasting countermovement or a more short-term range of aborted 
initiatives?” In this regard, two different types of analysis carried out in 
Europe by the same author “have shown that their development, although 
uneven in Europe, is by no means marginal.......and in some countries SFSC 
centred trajectories have become key elements of rural development”. 
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 To evaluate these hypotheses, it must be considered that there are 
elements that can currently facilitate a greater diffusion of the short chain, 
namely the higher cost of transport and the more accentuated environmental 
sensitivity (revaluation of zero km products) in addition to the social reasons 
for the neo-protectionist temptations underway55 both in more economic 
developed countries and less economic developed countries and for different 
reasons (see paragraph 3.5), without mentioning the search by consumers for 
cheaper products, which is an issue that can become ambivalent (see 
paragraph 3.4).  
 What goes against the favour of the short chain is, instead, the lack, at 
least up until now, of logistic efficiency and added value to the product, 
particularly in terms of time-saving services, which should be considered 
strategic with today’s rates of working and living.  
 Other elements neutrally facilitate large-scale retail distribution and 
the short chain, such as the speed with which information is disseminated 
with electronic connections and the potential of e-commerce. Orders over the 
internet and home delivery (box schemes) can be sales methods to be 
pursued by both chains, as shown by the first experiences already seen.  
 However, the box scheme mechanism is believed to be considered a 
potentially less interesting route by large-scale retail distribution, whilst it 
may be a tool able to better value the short chain, if it can manage to create 
an efficient organisation by which to exploit this mechanism appropriately. 
In this way, in fact, it may, also supplying the consumer with a more 
“customised” service, partly recover the gap with large-scale retail 
distribution in terms of time-saving. 
 In competition with the large scale retail distribution businesses, the 
small businesses of the short chain may be less weak if able to identify new 
forms of managerial efficiency, focussed on flexible specialisation (Saba, 
1994), in synergy with an optimisation of the territory and quality excellence 
of certain products. Suitable agricultural policies may provide small 
businesses with incentives in this sense, with perhaps indirect forms of aid, 
possibly organisational in type rather than financial, designed not to distort 
the spontaneous economic dynamics and, in any case, justifiable as a sort of 
compensation to these businesses, in recognition of their socially-useful 
capacity to rebalance the market56.  
                                                          
55 Reasons connected with aspirations of local populations to defend their territorial resources from 
exploitation determined by oligopolies and market globalisation. The current scenario “has nothing to 
do with the historic debate or liberists and protectionists” but rather concerns the dispute “between 
power policies and local populations”, between governments, countries and citizens for the use of the 
territory (Perna, 2008). 
56 In actual fact, recognised elements (Kjiaernes et al., 2007) able to resize the level of asymmetrical 
market power marking contractual relations in retail phases, are the protection level ensured by the 
individual states to domestic production and the level of horizontal coordination and organisation 
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3.3.  A SWOT analysis of the short supply chain in two different contexts 
The following SWOT analysis tables (figure 4 and figure 5) classify 
the endogenous strengths and weaknesses of the short chain, and the 
exogenous elements that can be seen as opportunities encouraging, or as 
risks/threats hindering, a positive outcome. 
 This analysis is here referred in a very simple way to just two 
different contexts: More Economic Developed Countries (MEDCs) and Less 
Economic Developed Countries, (LEDCs), macro-aggregated, in which – in 
this work, that as has already been mentioned, is purely a first approach to 
the problems of the short chain – the multiple situations examined by a fairly 
in-depth, but definitely not exhaustive empirical investigation, are 
approximately grouped and summarised. 
 Moreover, this type of analysis is used here merely to aid 
classification, and is aimed exclusively at providing an initial, unfinished 
clarification and order of ideas, without yet identifying the most appropriate 
methods by which to transform at least some of the weaknesses into 
strengths, making best use of all the opportunities shown and avoiding the 
risks/threats arising with different ‘weightings’ in the different contexts (here 
split only into: more economic developed and less economic developed 
countries) and in the different possible scenarios. 
 A complex aspect which was instead taken into account, is the 
consideration of the effects of the short chain, not only within the area and 
country in which it is realised, but also outside this, in markets that may even 
be physically distant (for example, an attempt was made to identify the 
effects on LEDCs of a variation in the consumption customs of the MEDCs). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
attained by the local agricultural offer. With regards to this last, essential aspect and its links with rural 
development, Renting et al. (2003) points out that “sustaining rural development through the evolution 
of SFSCs must be based upon both institutional support and new types of associational development 
involving a range of actors operating within the chains and their surrounding networks”.  
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        Figure 4 a. SWOT analysis of the short supply chain - Context: MEDCs                                     
 
 
 
 
 
Weaknesses 
 Niche market 
 Limited range of products 
 Limited quantity of products 
 Outside certain areas of concentration, demand 
is insufficient to allow for the release of 
production to farms that are not economically 
very small. In agricultural areas located further 
from town centres or major tourist resorts, 
“direct sales alone are not sufficient to 
guarantee an appropriate economic return”, 
taking into account the minimum investment 
required (Brunori et al., 2007) 
 Difficult to calibrate supply and demand in 
forecasts 
 Organizational and coordination difficulties 
and limited preparation of agricultural 
entrepreneurs 
 Not all agricultural products are suitable for 
direct sale, but only those that relate to end 
products for immediate use (differently from 
less developed economies, where the 
transformation of the base products is not 
necessary industrial, but can be carried out by 
the same family units of consumption) 
 Not time-saving markets or products 
 Release methods not compulsory for organic 
produce, despite being most appropriate 
 Limited logistics-commercial organization 
 No scale economies, insufficient solutions (for 
example, associationism) searched for, to find a 
scale of suitable commercial size for small 
farms 
 Less environmentally sustainable linked to 
scale ecology (Schlich, Fleissner, 2005), which 
can better be achieved elsewhere 
 
 
 
Strengths 
 Higher and more profitable prices, with a fair 
return for producers 
 Lower and more accessible price for consumers 
 Fresher products for consumers (particularly 
fruit and vegetables, which can be sold within 
24-48 hours of harvesting) 
 Product is generally good quality, guaranteed 
by the direct sale from the producer, who 
benefits by earning a good reputation 
 Product closely linked to territory, transparency 
of product origin and production method 
 Good connection with food and wine-related 
tourism (Gardini, Lazzarin, 2007) 
 Good connection with multipurpose nature of 
agricultural farms, encouraged in E.U. policy 
 Appropriate release for disadvantaged areas 
 Appropriate release for small farms 
 Release method that allows smaller farms to 
diversify production, creating an outlet for 
small quantities of different products 
 Release method that allows smaller farms to 
overcome administrative and hygiene-related 
barriers (Brunori, 2006) 
 Appropriate release for typical products 
 Appropriate release for organic produce 
 Independence, perception of the importance of 
their work, moral satisfaction for producers 
 Greater appreciation of the food’s cultural and 
other value, and moral satisfaction for 
consumers as they can discover the product’s 
traditions and their historical links with the 
agricultural social tissue of the territory of 
origin, directly from producers 
 Social sustainability linked to the personal 
relations developed through direct exchange 
 Environmental sustainability linked to the 
reduction of transport (reduction of food miles 
phenomenon) on a global level 
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Figure 4 b. SWOT analysis of the short supply chain - Context: MEDCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threats 
 Competition with professional traders and 
possible conflicts 
 Change in the characteristics of the short 
chain as it takes on those of other methods 
of commerce (competitive markets in 
terms of size and logistics organised by 
associations of agricultural workers, 
without, however, direct dialogue with 
consumers, and with a mixture of zero 
kilometre local products and those from 
associate farmers based in other regions) 
 Difficult to reach non-farm low cost sales 
areas 
 Difficult to identify and achieve the best 
volume sizes of exchange to exit from the 
niche 
 Limited growth of demand due to time-
saving related problems 
 Difficult to identify best possible logistics-
commercial organization, which must be less 
complex than the long chain, but just as 
efficient 
 Difficult to obtain consistent development of 
volumes exchanged without the efficiency of an 
appropriate logistics-commercial organization 
 Institutional support and various legislation 
still in a preliminary state or  lacking 
entirely in many countries This is 
configured as an exogenous risk variable, 
insofar as it can allow for the worsening or 
in any case expression of critical issues of 
various types as already mentioned in the 
weaknesses. (However, this regulatory-
institutional deficiency also constitutes an 
opportunity, as it is a gap that can still be 
filled in most appropriate way) 
 In terms of global equilibrium, income 
denied to LEDCs for the replacement of 
imports with local domestic products of the 
MEDCs, lacking an increase in the demand 
for agri-food products 
 
 
 
 
Opportunities 
 Growing demand from low-income 
consumers (linked to price and quality) 
 Growing demand from higher band 
consumers (linked to quality and cultural 
value of food) 
 Growing demand from restaurateurs 
(linked to price and quality) 
 Increase in food and wine-related tourism 
 Connections with cultural slow food 
movements 
 Connections with organic production will 
strengthen if relative regulations include 
stricter rules governing distribution 
 Survival (returning to a margin, to a 
greater or lesser extent) of small farms 
and/or farms in disadvantaged areas, thus 
able to increase income 
 Rural development in general, and 
particularly of disadvantaged and marginal 
areas 
 Possibility of enlivening town historic 
centres or other urban areas (abandoned or 
green areas), by using these to hold corner 
markets 
 Possibility of using town parks as points of 
sale, where locals can spend their free time 
as consumers offered a personalised 
commercial service to be enjoyed as a 
“hobby”, with no need to find time 
elsewhere 
 Possibility of creating single outlets in 
individual farms or aggregates in given 
points in rural areas, thereby animating the 
countryside  
 Educating consumers on diet by providing 
direct information on food 
 Improving sales and production methods 
according to expressed consumer needs 
 Encouraging marketing of the territory 
linked to its products (particularly to 
tourist consumers) 
 Possibility of exploiting promotions and 
public incentives for social services 
provided 
 Institutional support and various legislation 
still in a preliminary state or  lacking 
entirely in many countries This constitutes 
an opportunity, insofar as it leaves plenty 
of room for manoeuvre for the policies to 
be implemented (but it is also, at present, a 
risk factor). 
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Figure 5.  SWOT analysis of the short supply chain - Context: LEDCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weaknesses 
 
 Lack of capitals, technical and mechanical 
means 
 Lack of technological information to be 
appropriately linked to traditional farming knowledge 
 Intrinsic limits of the nature of the short chain 
in setting up external commercial relations 
 Limits to the growth of the short chain beyond  
the boundary of saturation of potentially solvent 
domestic consumption 
 Difficulty in achieving scale economies and 
scale ecology  
 
 
 
Strengths 
 
 Reduces dependency on external food 
products 
 Allows for greater self-supply of food with 
a local circuit in nutritional risk areas 
 Stops external production models (single 
crops) linked to export production dominating, 
which leads to overuse of natural resources and 
labour, and consequent impoverishing of 
collective goods and social capital 
 Raw products can also find an outlet in 
local circuits of these contexts, where the 
transformation of the base products is not 
necessary industrial, but can be carried out by 
the same family units of consumption 
 Initiates production and exchange of goods 
in an environmentally sustainable manner, 
worldwide (at zero km) 
 
Threats 
 Competition and adversity of powerful financial 
interests (product import companies and exporters of 
technical means linked to any present external 
production models) 
 Lack of government support due to unstable 
political situations, for any connivance with private 
interests from dominating groups in greatly stratified 
societies 
 Domestic demand for non-local products by 
higher-earning social groups 
 Difficult to complete endogenous development 
processes, due to lack of external commercial 
relations (exports) that can attract resources 
 Lack of income as a consequence of the reduction 
of exports of agri-food products if the MEDCs 
consume local products internally 
 Loss for the LEDCs of the positive cumulative 
effects (multiplier of investments, employment and 
income due to the export of agri-food products), due 
to the reduction of imports in the MEDCs. 
 Triggering in the LEDCs of cumulative negative 
effects in terms of divestment and progressive 
impoverishment following the reduction of their 
exports, due to the reduction of imports in the 
MEDCs.  
 Absence of a normative and/or international 
agreement that can discipline and protect the short 
supply chain. Difficulty to issue an international 
agreement base to enact some norms and to make 
these observed. 
 
 
 
Opportunities 
 Beginning endogenous socially and 
environmentally sustainable development 
processes 
 Encouraging marketing of the territory 
linked to its product in tourist destinations 
 Possibility to issue a normative or at least 
to stipulate an international accord that can 
make suitable fit measures observed to 
discipline the short supply chain and to 
contribute to develop that. 
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3.4. The debated advantages and limits of the short chain: the ‘economic 
place’ of its efficiency 
 The advantages of the short chain (Bullock et. al., 2000; Hilchey et. 
al., 2000) mainly comprise the sustainability of this method of sale from the 
various viewpoints: 
 economic: lower prices for purchasers and more profitable for 
producers,  
 environmental: reduction in energy consumption and pollution 
connected with transport and refrigeration storage of so-called ‘zero 
kilometre’ supply,  
 and social: direct consumer control of price and quality, fresher 
goods and healthier products, relationship of trust and direct 
exchange of information between producers and consumers, induced 
circuits and cumulative circuits of rural development in marginal 
areas.  
 These advantages are not limited to a mere reduction in consumer 
prices, and to a more satisfying sales price for producers, which, given the 
present crisis, could alone be a determining factor, but also to the way in 
which the demand is set up, with a search for typical, or in any case local, 
products, to which a series of merits is attributed, that add value to the goods 
themselves, as shown by studies on these matters concerning willingness to 
pay (A.A.V.V., Ohio State University, 2008). These motivations for 
consumption concerning a food’s “cultural worth”, relate to the medium-high 
income band of consumers, who are willing to pay premium prices for local 
products, in the same way as a reduced sales price can, instead, provide the 
prevailing motivation for lower income consumers. Furthermore, 
motivations both for consumption by private individuals and for public 
authorities to encourage zero kilometre supply are linked to environmental 
sustainability. 
 In relation to environmental sustainability, analysed in particular by 
studies on food miles (A.A.V.V., DEFRA, 2005), it must be considered that 
the environmental advantages of supply at zero kilometres may be doubted 
when the energy costs of the short chain versus the long chain are calculated 
with exclusive reference to the transport of the product and not the whole 
production cycle (Saunders et al., 2006; Kissinger, 2013). In this regard, the 
different production systems used in different geographic and climatic zones 
must also be considered (which involve the use of different technologies 
with diverse energy consumptions) and a “scale ecology” (Schlich, Fleissner, 
2005), which calculates the energy savings connected with the greater or 
lesser dimension of the production and transformation businesses, enabling 
an evaluation of all environmental compared costs of productions obtained 
and marketed by different types of businesses in the different parts of the 
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world (with various dimensional, logistical-organisational and climatic 
situations). Nor must other evaluations concerning consumer food choices57 
(Weber an Mattheus, 2008; Garnett T. 2011) be neglected (considering that 
the energy expense of production varies according to product type) and their 
journeys (Coley et al.,2009): routes that may be longer travelled (to reach, 
rather than the large retail market, the places of purchase, even nearby, of 
local products).  
 With regards to social and economic sustainability, despite the fact 
that locally, prices of products exchanged through a short chain are not 
always lower to purchasers than those offered by larger sales chains58, which 
have the advantage of working with significant scale economy in the long 
chain, and that in areas with low demographic density, there is too little 
demand (Brunori, 2007) to establish a market that is able to adequately 
remunerate the producers, there are other advantages. The fact remains that 
the short chain therefore allows consumers to directly control price and 
quality and their human relationship with the producers59, as well as 
allowing agricultural workers to make more independent production choices 
(Cicatiello, Franco, 2008), with consequent moral satisfaction. Furthermore, 
the short chain fully exploits the value of human and social capital, and of 
local, natural resources, thereby potentially leading to endogenous 
development both in marginal rural areas of more developed countries, and 
in less developed countries, where it can more efficiently oppose the 
phenomena of progressive impoverishing, both of natural and human 
resources, linked to the massive and rather careless introduction of external 
production models (Shiva, 1995) for intensive productions for export. 
 The short chain, furthermore, is by far the best solution to all 
problems, and in certain contexts, where it fails to find its natural setting or 
                                                          
57 For example, the choice of a vegetarian diet. 
58  It could be objected that in a competitive market, the uniqueness of price is automatically imposed 
for undifferentiated products, as traditionally were agricultural products. However, there is now a 
differentiation also for agricultural products, which no longer only perform the basic function of 
nourishment, but rather incorporate in various ways – through their intrinsic quality, origin, method of 
packaging and marketing – the satisfaction of other needs. These latter can range from time saving – 
specific to products marketed by large distribution chains – to aspects connected with the above-
mentioned cultural and environmental value, to health or typicality of taste, presumably or actually 
seen in products marketed by means of the short chain. Consequently, the market is not perfectly 
competitive (despite the different contractual power of the commercial businesses). This is why the 
products – in some way differentiated – sold in the farmers' markets can have differentiated prices, 
even independently of their different cost of production and, in particular, of marketing. These prices 
are normally more contained with respect to those of the conventional chain, probably because the 
products sold on the farmers’ markets do not satisfy certain needs, but may be equal or even higher in 
relation to the entity of demand, which reflects "trends" and the different importance attributed by the 
mass of consumers to the different type of quality incorporated in the products. 
59 For example, with ‘joint purchase groups’ the direct relationship between production and 
consumption "acquires specific features that go beyond a simple economic exchange” (Brunori, 2007). 
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“economic place”, it then becomes less efficient than the long chain. 
Generally speaking, it is particularly well suited to solving the problems of 
smaller, multipurpose farms, offering niche products (local, typical and/or 
organic). It is, on the other hand, less well suited to all situations dominated 
by medium and large enterprises, with the creation of economic and/or 
ecological type scale economies, where company supply is specialised and 
constitutes a consistent critical mass of product that can more easily be 
released onto a wider market than merely local, and consequently in types of 
companies where an efficient use of the entrepreneur’s time and work, makes 
it difficult for him to carry out a variety of tasks that would include the direct 
marketing of farm produce. Here, a long chain may be to greater advantage. 
Furthermore, direct sales are the perfect for products ready for consumption 
(Cicatiello, Franco, 2008), and not for products to be transformed, at least 
with reference to the organization of advanced societies ‘consumptions. 
Whilst in less developed countries, the short chain would appear to be most 
suitable when it creates local circuits also for the sale of raw products, such 
as basic cereals like wheat, which can here be transformed directly by the 
consumers. 
 Moreover, once the efficiency and advantages of the short chain have 
been ascertained in some areas, when the evaluation does not close on a local 
level but implies consideration of the global effects, due consideration must 
also be given to fall-out in terms of the movement of income that - for lack 
of an increase in consumptions - may occur between different regions and 
countries caused by alterations of the import-export balance (see paragraph 
3.5 below). 
 
3.5. Spread of the short and long chain and Level of market liberalisation 
 In evaluating all this, we must state that the potential of the short 
chain must not be overestimated, as it currently plays a limited role in 
developed country trade, with market shares that, although growing, are 
forecast as modest even in the near future, and in developing countries, we 
see an increasing market penetration by large scale retail distribution. 
However, the short chain can constitute a strategic tool to be offset or 
associated with different outlet alternatives promoted by globalisation. A 
greater spread of the short chain – or, where more present in developing 
countries, a strengthening of this in efficiency terms, aimed at its prospective 
non-drastic reduction – may prove profitable in any case. This greater 
presence may be useful to better balance the market and, if associated with 
appropriate supports, perhaps linked to micro credit, to allow, developing 
countries in particular to make a more direct food supply in the poorer areas, 
also - for example in the case of supplies not only for domestic consumption 
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but also tourism - giving rise to endogenous development processes (both in 
developing countries and in marginal rural areas within developed countries).  
 In less economic developed countries, promoting self-supply circuits, 
and contrasting the potentially socially destabilising effects (Shiva, 2008) of 
the long chain, when it identifies with the presence of major companies with 
oligopolistic and oligopsonistic power60 the short chain may constitute a tool 
enabling a partial “de-linking” (Amin, 1990) from international trade and 
relations based on asymmetrical contractual strength. In fact, it must be 
considered that a greater development of the short chain presupposes the 
presence of self-supply circuits with a potential reduction of international 
trade that can, absurdly, not always be advantageous in situations of 
unbalanced contractual strength. This does not mean upholding the theory of 
the ‘dependentistas’, overcome by more complex overall market visions, nor 
failing to recognise the claimed benefits of free trade, but rather considering 
situations where such benefits are not seen. This can occur in the exchanges 
between strong exporting countries and countries that mainly import 
(UNCTAD, 2003), between richer, more developed countries and poorer, 
less developed countries, between countries with different institutional and 
social frames, where situations far from perfect competition of businesses 
with different contractual strength are created, which can alter trade relations 
and cause (for the weaker country) the mutual benefit of the exchange to fail, 
even in conditions of different compared cost advantages of the products 
exchanged by the countries. For example, estimates made on the impact 
envisaged by a “plausible” scenario of the Doha Round, envisaged benefits 
deriving from the liberalisation of trade that differ greatly between developed 
countries and developing countries 61. 
 Moreover, the ‘neoprotectionist’ measure, considered too strong, of 
the limitation or prohibition for export adopted by some countries to protect 
against speculation on food products in relation to the financial and 
economic crisis of recent years (and in particular we refer to countries such 
as Vietnam, India and Thailand62, producers and consumers of rice), shows 
how promoting self-supply circuits is still relevant today in specific 
                                                          
60 This power, as has been shown by the empirical evidence (Sexton et al., 2007), also cancels out 
much of the advantages for poorer farmers deriving from free trade (approx. half the benefits would be 
absorbed by commercial intermediation).  
61These envisaged “benefits deriving from free trade that are far higher in developed countries that in 
developing countries”. Some estimates even show that for some of these latter countries, “loss is 
forecast”, even if it must be specified that there is “significant divergence in the estimated results, not 
only between models but also in simulations of the same model made with the database of reference of 
different years” (Pascantili, 2006). 
62 Which have respectively imposed a net cut of 11%, complete embargo and quota restriction to the 
exports of rice in order to prioritise internal supplies (Rampini, 2008).  
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situations, despite the fact that it must always be combined with the 
activation of profitable trade circuits. 
 Again with regard to developed countries, the short chain results in a 
release of weak enterprises or relatively poor areas from competition with 
stronger areas and companies, bringing the consumer to the product rather 
than vice versa, by optimising links between product and territory. 
 On the other hand, we must also highlight the opposite, namely the 
fact that an indiscriminate practise of the short chain can result in significant 
social and economic negative impacts, particularly when this combines too 
much with the stated protectionist measures, limiting free trade on the 
international market. More specifically, an accentuated, at times ideological 
and intransigent, predilection for the short chain by consumers in wealthy 
countries63 can seriously damage exporting less developed countries of some 
agricultural food products, on whose proceeds the survival of entire 
populations of some of their rural areas depends64. This is, in any case, true, 
despite the continued validity of the above (see paragraph  3.1) on the 
elimination for the poorer farmers of part of the advantages deriving from 
free trade, due to the share absorbed by commercial intermediation.  
 We therefore need to analyse and assess prudently, on a case-by-case 
basis, what can occur in different contexts and situations, in order to evaluate 
the dramatic trade-off between environmental sustainability (with reference 
to the reduction of food miles) or social-economic (with reference to the 
safeguarding of income in less developed countries) and the development of 
rural areas in importing or exporting countries, due to the movement of 
income that is seen between them, for lack of an increase in consumption 65. 
One choice between the development of the rural areas of importing 
countries, with increased local productions (Meter and Rosales, 2001; 
Swensen, 2006, 2009, 2010; Sonntag, 2008; and others), or in exporting 
countries, with the increase of goods transported by international trade, may 
be misleading, when due consideration is not taken of the unsuitability of 
food miles as an indicator of overall environmental impact generated by food 
(Defra, 2005; Saunders, 2006; Weber and Matthews, 2008; Kissinger, 2013, 
and others), as well as the obstacles that arise, particularly in less developed 
countries, hindering the creation of a virtuous circle linked to export, or that 
can be generated alternatively by an increase in domestic trade. 
                                                          
63 Consider the ‘localvore’ movement or the successful slogan ‘buy fresh, buy local’ linked to an 
ideology concerning environmental, health and/or support aspects to local development. 
64 On this, Muller (2007) speaks of the ‘moral duty’ of English consumers to buy strawberries 
imported from Africa at Christmas, rather than local products.  
65 Furthermore, also within a single country the promotion of local production-consumption circuits, 
although able to start of employment and income growth processes in the area where it is introduced, it 
does pose the problem of the choice of increasing farming income in different regions, respectively 
importing and exporting internal agricultural products. 
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 In actual fact, to produce for export does not always result in 
advantages for less developed  countries. In some cases, an agriculture that is 
mainly focussed on export can increase food insecurity, trapping small 
farmers in a debt cycle and pushing them away from the land (DeWeerd, 
2009). It all depends on the way in which sale take place and the type of 
contractual relations. A study carried out on small farmers of the state of 
Santa Catarina in south Brazil, Pretty (2006?)  reports better economic 
returns for these small farmers deriving from the direct sale of their products 
to consumers nearby, rather than from grow contracts of products to large 
commercial companies operating globally. However, the economic 
advantages deriving from the implementation of the local food systems has 
been shown in some a few cases (DeWeerd, 2009), due to social-economic 
constraints hindering the start-up of virtuous circuits. 
 Only an ideal combination of products exchanged on the international 
market (when it is possible to actually exploit the comparative cost benefit) 
and products obtained and consumed locally, with holding the new wealth 
produced within rural areas (when capable of multiplying investments and 
therefore employment and income) can allow the rural economies of both 
countries (MEDCs and LEDCs) to develop in the same way. This is why we 
need to remove the commercial mechanisms generating said obstacles to the 
positive effects.  
 It is by no coincidence that when talking, for example, about fair 
trade procedures, which, however, constitute market niches, albeit growing 
on a world level, the problem of assessing the real benefits of export for less 
economic developed countries does not exist: the advantage is clear. Neither 
can the trade-off of exports and local circuits be seen as a dilemma. In actual 
fact, we can see that some joint buying groups - striving for the mutual 
benefit of consumers and small producers - support both the short chain 
within a country and the import from developing countries, when this is 
carried out through fair trade circuits. These latter circuits, furthermore, 
despite the distance, in some way “shorten the chain”, eliminating much 
commercial intermediation and relevant margins. The behaviour of these 
buying groups, focussed on identifying alternative food sales chains, do not 
therefore show clear conflict between these different commercial circuits, 
both rejecting logics linked to oligopolistic and oligopsonistic market power. 
 In actual fact, what respectively positively characterises the so-called 
short chain with respect to the long chain, is not so much the reduction of the 
physical distance between the place of production and that of distribution 
(not always efficient also in terms of total environmental benefit), nor the 
more or less accentuated commercial “dis-intermediation” (also partly 
implemented by the search for efficiency of large-scale retail distribution, 
but which becomes non influential on the income of producers and 
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consumers when the benefit of the reduction in the gap between production 
and consumer price is incorporated by the large-scale retail distribution 
itself), as it is the type of more balanced contractual relationship between 
production, distribution and consumption. And so also the absence of useless 
circuits66 that increase food miles, and relevant packaging miles, together 
with the related economic and environmental costs of transport, due to the 
type of LRSD logistical organisation in order to exploit wider profits in the 
global market. 
 
3.6. Short and long chain, production and outlet opportunities: not 
necessarily alternatives 
 Up until now, we have discussed the conflicts between the short and 
long chain in various contexts. However, they need not always oppose each 
other in a given context, but on some occasions and in some contexts the two 
different production and outlet circuits can actually coexist, as seen in studies 
performed in Italy on “Marshallian industrial districts”. This may come as a 
surprise, given that, generally speaking, the districts, which exalt the links 
between the product and the unique characteristics of the land of origin, for 
their very nature are best associated with the short chain, and when we talk 
of encouraging mechanisms by which to promote the founding of 
agricultural or rural districts, we are almost always talking about advancing 
short circuits. 
 Instead, it is precisely here, in these districts, that dualism is almost 
cancelled out (Castellani, 2007) between the short and long chain and the 
different types of enterprises, when beneficial, can exploit the opportunities 
offered up by each or both of these. The choice of the most convenient 
alternative for individual businesses is determined by their specific 
dimension and particular value chain (Porter, 1985) that affects the choice of 
whether or not to delocalize production (Micelli, Chiarvesio, 2003). 
 Medium-sized enterprises particularly benefit from both these 
opposing production and sales methods, often used simultaneously, where an 
‘economic place’ is created, making this an appropriate choice. The 
production circuit can even partially, therefore, be delocalized, as is typical 
of the long chain. This delocalisation is used to reduce production costs by 
smaller enterprises than those of the long chain too67. At the same time, sales 
can exist both in loco through a short chain, and externally, through a long 
                                                          
66 It has higlighted by Wuppertal Institute researchers using the typical exemple of the yogurt with 
strawberry selled in Stuttgart’s market. 
67 Perhaps through the preferential use of contractual instruments rather than with direct investments 
abroad, usually used in the production internationalisation of large companies (Micelli, Chiarvesio, 
2003). 
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chain, but incorporating the advantages of product reputation, typical of the 
short chain and valued by its simultaneous presence. 
 In this way, a formal apparent connection is maintained with the 
territory-district of production origin, which in this case, is the “historic” 
place of knowledge and production tradition, and where the company’s 
headquarters, organization and production assembly continues to be based, 
and from where all directives concerning production methods, are imparted 
(production rules) and certification of product supplied. We speak of 
certification of goods which, even if the final products are obtained through 
steps carried out in different areas, comply with quality standards and the 
typical nature of the district product, of which they bear the name. 
 This reality, already seen in studies in industrial-manufacturing 
districts, now also appears in agri-food districts, where the ultimate 
transformation of the product may take place with commodities that are only 
partially local, or at times where raw materials may even be produced for 
transformation elsewhere.  
 This type of situation is feared (Amin 1993; Rullari 1997, 2002) able 
to potentially bring about a dissolution of the district systems over time, 
lacking in the basic characteristics that are so closely linked to production 
localisation and the specific characteristics of the territory in which they 
were spontaneously created; this is, however, the result of the adaptation 
process adopted by dynamic businesses striving to survive market 
globalisation. 
 International competition leads to a reduction in production costs 
through delocalization, which assumes acquiring various inputs, each in the 
area of least cost, and subsequent assembly of the various steps in any space, 
identified more than anything else, according to the best organization and 
lowest logistics costs, but at the same time, this competition heads towards 
an ever-greater appreciation of the so-called positional goods, namely those 
associated with a different level of quality-related reputation. 
 The current market trend looks towards increasing commerce of 
goods defined (Yotopoulos, 2007) as “decommodified”, i.e. differentiated 
goods protected by intellectual property rights and/or trademarks, differently 
from the traditional undifferentiated products (“commodities”). And 
competition, which is increasingly “based on quality (real and/or perceived) 
rather than on production costs”, becomes positional in type, and appreciated 
by companies, as its very nature leads to the formation of undisputable 
markets that generate income (Romano, 2007). This income, please note, 
accentuates asymmetries between more developed countries and less 
developed countries, in the first’s favour, considering that the latter mainly 
produce undifferentiated goods. 
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 With the simultaneous presence of different structures of production 
branches and sales circuits, district companies, therefore attempt to compete 
on both fronts (reducing costs by delocalization and keeping product 
reputation linked to the area of origin), even if we can assume that both 
competitive advantages, although possible, cannot continue to be coupled 
long-term. The “typical” product quality, which gives it its reputation, is, of 
course, at one with local production. 
 It is not currently possible to forecast just how the district model may 
evolve through the de-construction and reconstruction of relationship 
systems. What we do know, however, is that if it does not transform into 
something new and different, it will have to head towards the choice of a 
circuit that, in addition to guaranteeing an albeit specific standard quality, 
will also regain (through re-localisation?) truly typical aspects, as failure to 
do so would result in the progressive loss of the traditional reputation, in 
addition to the loss of that inherent creativity within the district, which – 
even if benefitting from exchanges with the outside world – primarily gives 
businesses the capacity to innovate, taking an original route. 
 To this end, we should clarify a basic misunderstanding: we need to 
distinguish long production and sales circuits from those that relate 
exclusively to product sales. Whilst the first do not well adapt to district 
traditions, separating the close link that identifies the product to a territorial 
matrix, the second can happily coexist with short circuits, as differentiated 
outlet opportunities for goods that can be consumed in loco not only by 
residents, but by tourists too, or alternatively exported from the district area, 
each time either taking the consumer to the product or the product to the 
consumer (Sini, 1998), without this affecting the reputation of the goods and 
its positional competition 
 If referred to sales alone, the two circuits can reciprocally benefit 
each other where a high quality product internally and externally blends 
marketing of both product and territory. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 The analysis performed is a contribution towards the assessment of 
alternative opportunities for product outlet releases for the different types of 
farms in different environments. Amongst other issues, it highlights the fact 
that the type of relationship between long and short chain is not always one 
of conflict, with specific reference to areas constituting agri-industrial 
districts.  
 To conclude, we must stress the importance of specific studies 
aiming to assess the environments of greater relative convenience, those 
where there may be an overlay, juxtaposition and opposition of the long and 
short chain, in order to identify an optimal coexistence in the various 
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contexts, on a local and, overall, global scale, between the two methods of 
production and sale of products on the agricultural food markets system. 
This optimal combination (or at least the choice of the most efficient 
combinations) in the articulation of market outlet methods may provide a 
useful tool, amongst others, to help achieve greater stability of the global 
market, limit prices and to their efficiency in allocating resources under the 
scope of attaining an economic benefit that is not separated from social and 
environmental sustainability.  
As concerns the immediate possibility of carrying out these studies, 
we note the lack of suitably-designed ad hoc market simulation models with 
which to consider the problems presented and the difficulty in constructing 
them and having them function, both due to the complexity of the situations 
to be represented and the scarcity and inhomogeneity of the data available, 
particularly on a local scale 
Moreover, even if a solution to the problem were to be reached in 
technical terms, there would be significant hindrance to actually 
transforming any indications of economic policy that may arise from the 
results of the evaluation into operative developments given the interests at 
hand and, above all, the international dimension of the process, which, by its 
very nature, is difficult to govern. 
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